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Abstract — A configuration management system (CMS) can 
control large networks of computers. A modern CMS is 
idempotent and describes infrastructure as code, so that it uses 
a description of the desired state of a system to automatically 
correct any deviations from a defined goal. As this requires 
both complete control of the slave systems and unquestioned 
ability to provide new instructions to slaves, the private key of 
the master is highly valuable target for attackers. Criminal 
malware networks already survive in hostile, heterogeneous 
networks, and therefore, the concepts from those systems could 
be applied to benign enterprise CMSs. We describe one such 
concept, the hidden master architecture, and compare its 
survivability to existing systems using attack trees.
Keywords - configuration management system; survivability; 
attack tree; command and control; botnet
I. INTRODUCTION
Configuration management systems (CMSs) have 
proliferated to meet the challenges of growing sizes of 
computer networks with more hosts per administrator, 
heterogeneous networks, cloud [1] and grid computing, 
stricter requirements for verified security and faster 
response time to markets using DevOps methods [2]. A 
CMS is an essential part of large computer installations, as 
they can extend life, reduce cost, reduce risk, and even 
correct defects [3].
Modern configuration tools are versionable and 
idempotent. In practice, the configuration manifests 
describing the target state of the network must be plain text 
to be stored in a version control system. This “Infrastructure 
as Code” approach allows administrators to use software 
engineering methodology to control their network [4]. 
Idempotence means that an operation can be applied 
multiple times without changing the result beyond the initial 
application.
CMSs are based on the master-slave architecture. The 
master computer will issue configurations, and the slave 
computers apply these configurations. Thus, a successful 
attack on a master results in full compromise of every slave 
it controls. This makes it a very tempting target for attack 
and therefore, protecting CMSs gets a high priority.   
II. SURVIVABILITY
Survivability is the capability of a system to fulfill its 
mission in the face of challenges. These challenges or faults 
include attacks by human adversaries, system failures, 
accidents and failures of large parts of network infrastructure 
[5, 6, 7]. These challenges or faults are often meant to cover 
all potential damaging events to the system [6].
The purpose of the system is essential when evaluating 
survivability. Even if individual components stay functional, 
the system has failed if it fails to provide the intended service 
it was designed for. Identification of essential services is the 
key concept of survivability. Essential systems are those that 
either are required for meeting the mission requirements or 
those whose failures threaten the system. [8] A CMS meets 
the criteria of an essential system, as a compromise of the 
CMS results in full compromise of all controlled systems. 
Also, without a CMS it becomes difficult or even impossible 
to react to changing environments and threats in a timely 
manner.
Information security is traditionally defined as the CIA 
triad: confidentiality, integrity and availability. 
Confidentiality means that confidential information is not 
exposed to unauthorized parties. Integrity is the assurance 
that data is not modified without permission. Availability 
means that systems respond to users in timely manner [9]. 
Some writers consider information security a subcategory of 
survivability [10].
Survivability analysis is the process of identifying 
components susceptible to attacks, then quantifying the 
capability to survive these attacks [5]. One method of 
identifying suitable targets for attack is the attack tree 
method. To compare attack trees, we’ll look at both 
malware and CMS network architectures.
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III. MALWARE COMMAND AND CONTROL NETWORK 
ARCHITECTURES
Botnet is a network of compromised machines under 
the control of an attacker [11]. Largest botnets have had 
millions of slave computers in hostile, heterogeneous 
environments. As these botnets are extensively documented, 
they can provide insights into possibilities of novel network 
architectures for CMSs. Even though the CMS tools could 
be used for malware CC and vice versa, in this paper we 
categorize tools by their intended or most common purpose.
Malicious botnets have both similarities and 
differences to benign configuration management tools. Both 
aim to provide a scalable, resilient and timely updates to 
slave configuration. But only botnets require secrecy in each 
point: slave, network and possible CC server. Botnets might 
also require the ability to reduce their forensic footprint, 
function in more heterogeneous environments and withstand 
legally sanctioned attacks against their CC infrastructure 
and unpredictably changing network conditions. Botnets are 
sometimes used for extracting data from victim systems, and 
this puts additional strain on secrecy requirements. Once the 
CC analysis has been published, interested parties can create 
new intrusion detection system (IDS) rules and antivirus 
detection routines [11].
Command and control channels have seen 
improvements over time. Some earlier botnets, such as 
Agabot, SDBot and SpyBot, used Internet relay chat (IRC) 
as a control channel. Network operators can attempt to 
automatically detect botnet activity, making uncommon 
protocols hard to hide. This has made HTTP a tempting 
choice for bots such as BlackEnergy, Rustock and Clickbot. 
[11]
Gu considers IRC a push architecture, because 
commands are immediately sent to slaves as the botmaster 
sends them [12]. It should be noted that in the client-server 
architecture, the slaves (bots) are still clients when they 
connect to the IRC server. In this way, they can access the 
master trough NAT and firewall.
At its peak, Zeus botnets had infected 3.6 million 
computers in just the US. As Zeus was a banking malware, 
it caused significant damage. In Zeus botnet, slaves use 
direct HTTP connection to pull catalogs from CC server. 
Because Zeus is crime-ware, a tool to build these botnets, 
multiple parties have created their own botnets and their CC 
infrastructures. Thus, destroying a single set of CC servers 
is not enough to disable Zeus. [11]
For a truly distributed operation, some bots have 
adopted peer-to-peer (P2P) architecture. In P2P, slaves 
connect to each other without a central server. In TCP/IP 
sense, each node can act as either server or client, as 
dictated by network conditions. Dittrich (2008) names 
Peacomm and Nugache as examples of P2P botnets [13]. In 
addition to the lack of server as a single point of failure, he 
mentions small network footprint and unpredictable traffic 
patterns as additional benefits.
Conficker.C was a highly advanced botnet in 2009. 
Variants of Conficker infected millions of machines and 
saw constant updates and move to more stealthy operation. 
Conficker.C used a time based algorithm for locating peers, 
and thus avoided the need for initial seed list of peers. [14]
Stuxnet was a botnet to attack Iranian nuclear facilities. 
It is the first successful cyber attack with physical damage 
of this scale [15]. The target factories enjoyed military 
protection, the computers were air gapped and the virus 
operated in a country that likely was highly suspecting of 
the makers of the malware. The version of Stuxnet caught 
for analysis used a direct HTTP connection to pre-
programmed servers [16].
Naz was the first bot using social networks as a CC 
channel. It uses steganography to hide control messages on 
Twitter, pretending to be a human user. Other social 
networks and third party services could be used as a CC 
channel by new botnets. [17]
Cryptolocker and similar software encrypt user files 
and extort for money. The ransom must be paid in Bitcoin to 
receive the key to decrypt the files. Modern encryption 
extortion can even work without a traditional CC network, 
as the password is passed for human to type after criminals 
have received payment.
This look on the CC networks of successful malware 
indicates some trends in protocols and architectures. 
Considering protocols, many networks use standard 
protocols, especially HTTP/HTTPS. It could be speculated 
that this is driven by existing tooling and skill in these 
common protocols, ability bypass even the most restrictive 
firewalls and the possibility to hide in the noise of existing 
traffic using the same protocols. The architectures seem to 
remove single points of failure and distance the actual 
master (with signing keys to control slaves) from direct 
connection to slaves, while still securing the catalogs against 
hostile modification.
To recognize malware CC concepts not yet applied to 
CMSs, we look into the state of CMS network architectures. 
IV. IMPLIED DIRECT MASTER-SLAVE CONNECTION
To send the instructions over a network such as 
Internet, typical systems use client-server architecture 
between a master and slaves. The server can reside on the 
slave (push) or on the master (pull). Many articles on CMS 
assume that slaves must at some point directly contact the 
master. This assumption can be either explicit or, more 
often, implicit. As we have seen in the examination of 
successful malware CC architectures, such direct contact is 
not an absolute requirement.
In their comparison of open source CMSs, Delaet 
considers only two possible network architectures: push and 
pull. He explicitly states on page 6: “In all approaches, each 
managed device contains a deployment agent that can be 
push or pull based” [18].
Karvinen, Tero and Li, Shuliang. Investigating Survivability of Configuration Management Tools in Unreliable and Hostile 
Networks. Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Information Management (ICIM 2017), Chengdu, China. 21st - 
23rd April 2017. IEEE. 
Vanbrabant [19] categorizes “deployment 
architectures” of CMSs to pull or push, implying direct 
network connection between a master and slaves. This is 
further emphasized by his examples. Poat et al. [20] have 
selected popular CMSs (Chef, Puppet, CFEngine) for 
comparison, all of which require direct connection between 
a master and slaves to configure multiple computers. In their 
paper on orchestration (“model-driven Cloud management”) 
Wettinger et al. [1] imply direct connection between a 
master and a server in their choice of tools and in the 
options they use for the orchestration system to deploy the 
catalogs. Even though there are multiple peer-reviewed 
works on applying the configuration, less interest is paid on 
the secure transport of these configuration instructions. For 
example, Swięcicki[21] describes a novel tool “Overlord”, 
but bypasses the transfer by stating that the “program then 
could be transported to the target machine”.
Practical CMSs in the industry are using direct push 
and pull architectures, too. We briefly compared modern, 
free software CMSs. For the purposes of this work, tools 
using idempotent configuration with infrastructure as code 
were considered modern. Tools whose licensing met both 
the criteria of the Open Source Initiative (OSI) and Free 
Software Foundation (FSF) were considered free software.
We collected a list of candidates from literature survey 
[22], articles referenced in this paper (e.g. [20]) and non-
academic sources. The list was then filtered to exclude dead 
projects, those failing to meet the criteria of free, idempotent 
and infrastructure-as-code. To identify key tools, the interest 
to those tools was evaluated by estimating both fresh (since 
2015) academic references using Google Scholar and non-
academic search traffic based upon Google Trends data. 
Both approaches gave similar results. The key CMSs were 
Puppet, Chef, Ansible and Salt. If we would have 
considered older academic references for tools that still have 
large production installations, CFEngine would have been 
included in this list, too.
The key CMS Puppet, Chef, Ansible, Salt (and 
CFengine) all use either direct push or direct pull approach. 
They allow for local application of configuration, if the 
source code for configuration is securely transported to 
slaves. All key CMS can be configured to use any of pull, 
push or locally applied architectures, but they usually prefer 
and recommend one architecture over others. Puppet, Chef, 
Salt and CFengine recommend pull, Ansible recommends 
push.
Most key CMSs use common protocols for transfer. 
Puppet and Chef use HTTPS, specifically hypertext transfer 
protocol (HTTP) protected by transport layer security (TLS) 
with self-signed certificates. Ansible uses secure shell 
(SSH), namely OpenSSH. Salt uses more unique approach 
of ZeroMQ based protocol to allow very fast (non-
idempotent) parallel command execution in addition to 
idempotent catalogs.
This overview of the academic articles and key CMSs 
has indicated that both literature and the key CMS tools 
assume direct pull or push connection between slaves and a 
trusted master server.
V. HIDDEN MASTER ARCHITECTURE
As we have noted, combining catalog signing keys 
(root access to slaves) with catalog distribution causes 
security risks and other problems. Hidden master 
architecture avoids this problem by keeping the signing keys 
in a computer that only connects to the Internet to upload 
catalogs to an intermediate server.
These intermediate catalog distribution servers do not 
need to be secure. In fact, they can be commodity web 
servers in networks not controlled by an organization using 
a CMS. As distributing static files from a web server is very 
efficient, working as an intermediate distribution server for 
catalogs could be a side job for any computer with a web 
server.
Physical control of computers is a prerequisite for 
security: “boot access is root access”. For example, an 
infrastructure or platform as a service (IaaS or PaaS) hosting 
provider usually has full access to guest systems. In 
traditional push or pull based systems, this precludes storing 
catalogs in inexpensive cloud providers such as Amazon, 
DigitalOcean or Linode.
In the hidden master architecture, having multiple low 
value, untrusted servers to distribute catalogs can remove 
catalog distribution as a single point of failure. Using 
inexpensive third party cloud providers improves 
survivability against problems that affect whole networks or 
geographical locations.
A. The Operation of the Hidden Master Architecture
Asymmetric encryption is used for securing the 
communication between the hidden master and the slaves. 
Each slave has a secret key to open the catalogs encrypted 
by the slave public key on the hidden master. These keys 
can be generated either on master or the slave as dictated by 
practical requirements when provisioning the systems. 
The most valuable key is the hidden master private 
key, which is generated and always stays in the master 
computer. This key used for signing the instructions for 
each slave. All slaves have a copy of the related, trusted 
public key. The slaves blindly trust any instructions signed 
by the key of the hidden master. This key is protected by the 
hidden master architecture, as none of the slaves know how 
to reach the hidden master. The hidden master can stay 
offline during normal operation. 
To command the slaves, operator uses the hidden 
master to compile catalogs of instructions to slaves, which 
are then encrypted using each slave’s public key and signed 
with the hidden master’s private key. These encrypted 
catalogs are transferred to untrusted intermediate hosts 
known to slaves. Each slave downloads these instructions 
when it’s periodically checking the intermediate distribution 
hosts. If the slave can decrypt the catalog using its secret 
key and verify the signature using the hidden master’s 
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public key, the instructions are then applied. Otherwise, the 
encrypted catalog is discarded. 
We have performed initial experiments of 
implementing hidden master architecture with an existing 
key CMS. This reduces the amount of novel code, making it 
possible to improve survivability without developing a 
whole configuration management system with a resource 
abstraction layer and domain specific language.
B. Comparing Hidden Master Architecture to 
Push/Pull Attack Tree
Attack tree is a method of systematically categorizing 
all methods by which the system can be attacked [23, 24].
Attack tree takes the view of an attacker, and starts 
with the goal of compromising the target system. This is the 
root node of the tree. This node is then divided into 
subnodes by splitting the problem area. Each subnode is 
further split until all attacks have been enumerated. Each 
branch can consist of parts of attack that must all be 
achieved (AND) or alternative avenues of attacks (OR). [25, 
pp. 4–6]
Compromising the master server is the ultimate goal of 
the attack. Once the signing keys are obtained, the attacker 
fully controls all slaves. No further attacks would be needed, 
and the attacker can move on to fulfill his mission, such as 
exfiltration of data, launching further attacks on other 
networks, encrypting essential data for extortion or 
installing advanced persistent threats. Disabling a CMS will 
also make it difficult to react to threats and faults in a timely 
matter.
Figure 1 shows attack tree against regular pull 
architecture. Attack surface reduced by the proposed hidden 
master architecture is crossed out. The main challenge to 
survivability in regular pull architecture is the high value of 
the master server. On one hand, it needs heavy protection 
against attacks, thus limiting it to secure premises and 
computers without other software limiting attack surface. 
After all, a successful attack on the master server would 
mean compromising all slaves, making it the most valuable 
computer in the network it controls. On the other hand, in 
order to withstand disruptions in the network, master servers 
should be duplicated in multiple networks and geographical 
locations.
Even if some of these problems could be mitigated by 
creating completely separate configurations and master 
servers, this would soon mean losing single source of truth, 
making administration more expensive and error prone.
Fig 1: An attack tree with reduced attack surface crossed out
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In the hidden master architecture, the servers contacted 
by slaves are not trusted. There can be large number of these 
servers, and the encrypted catalogs can be served as a side 
function of any low value web servers. Because the 
encrypted catalogs are simple files, distributing them around 
the globe and in different networks is very cheap. In fact, all 
slaves do not need to know all the places where new 
instructions can be provided, leaving some locations to 
work as backup for the most valuable slaves.
Receiving log data from slaves is left for future 
research. To use a similar methodology as in this paper, it 
could be looked what techniques malware uses for data 
exfiltration.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Malware command and control networks survive in 
hostile and unreliable environment. Many CC networks use 
encryption over HTTP protocol and distance the actual 
master, that is, the owner of the trusted signing keys, from 
catalog distribution, so that slaves do not have access to 
master.
Current industry practice in CMSs is for slaves to 
directly contact single or few master servers directly. As the 
trusted signing keys reside on the master, they are clearly 
the most valuable computers in the network they control. 
The value of the masters requires very high level of both 
physical and software security, which poses challenge to 
survivability, as attempts to improve availability by 
duplicating the servers in different networks reduce the 
owner’s control of these systems.
In this paper, we have proposed hidden master 
architecture to alleviate this problem. In hidden master 
architecture, the master with the trusted signing keys only 
contacts the network when uploading encrypted, signed 
catalogs to untrusted distribution servers. These untrusted 
distribution servers can be any commodity web servers. The 
slaves download the catalogs from any of these servers. If 
some intermediate servers are down or compromised, the 
slaves simply contact the next servers. Initial experiments 
have been conducted and the findings are encouraging. It is 
possible for us to enhance survivability without the need for 
developing a whole configuration management system.
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